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LOVABLE PIRATES?                                                                                             
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN 
ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND WHALERS IN THE SOUTHERN OCEAN 
AMANDA M. CAPRARI  
The International Whaling Commission has banned commercial 
whaling by member nations since 1986.  Although a member of this 
Commission, Japan has continued its whaling practices under the guise of 
scientific research, hunting hundreds of whales every season in the 
Antarctic waters.  The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, a radical 
environmentalist group, has declared war on the Japanese whaling fleet 
and mounted a campaign to attack the Japanese whaling fleet using non-
lethal tactics.  The environmentalists and whalers are now locked in a 
bitter battle in the Southern Ocean, where there is little enforcement of 
domestic and international law.  This Note examines the legal 
consequences of this controversy and suggests necessary action to resolve 
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LOVABLE PIRATES?                                                                                             
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN 
ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND WHALERS IN THE SOUTHERN OCEAN  
AMANDA M. CAPRARI * 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The term “whaling” often conjures up images of sailors long ago 
departing sea-side New England towns on tall wooden ships powered by 
sail and wind in search of a single animal to sustain the town through the 
dark, cold winter.  When considering modern-day whaling, images of 
sailors with harpoons in hand are replaced by images of eight thousand-ton 
diesel-powered steel ships with harpoon guns mounted on the deck, 
capable of killing, processing, and packaging several whales per day. 
In response to modern-day whaling, environmentalist groups have 
protested the activity and demanded that it be stopped.  The Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society (“Sea Shepherd”), considered one of the most radical 
of such groups, has gone well beyond merely holding up protest signs and 
instead has engaged in dangerous tactics, such as ramming whaling vessels 
and disabling their propeller systems, all in an attempt to stop the killings.  
The group specifically targets Japanese whaling ships that operate in 
Antarctic waters.  Sea Shepherd has created a battleground in the Southern 
Ocean as it pits itself, champion of the whales, against the Japanese 
whaling fleet and its multi-million dollar business of harvesting whale 
meat.  Despite various international laws that are designed to stop such 
activity on the high seas, few countries have taken steps to interfere in this 
fierce battle that will ultimately cost human lives. 
Both the hunters and the protectors claim to have the legal authority to 
operate as they do.  Japan claims that it is not violating the International 
Whaling Commission’s (“IWC” or the “Commission”) ban on commercial 
whaling because it is operating under a research exception that allows 
member states to kill whales each year for scientific purposes.1  Sea 
Shepherd claims that under the United Nations World Charter for Nature, 
the group has the authority to enforce international conservation laws by 
                                                                                                                          
* United States Coast Guard Academy, B.S. 2003; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 
Candidate 2011.  I would like to thank Professor Kurt Strasser for his guidance throughout the writing 
process.  I would also like to thank my parents, Chris and Cathy Caprari, for their unending love.  This 
Note is dedicated to my husband, Dan, for always being by my side.  Any errors contained herein are 
mine and mine alone.   
1 Raffi Khatchadourian, A Reporter at Large: Neptune’s Navy, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 2007, at 
56, 58. 
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any means necessary.2  Specifically, Sea Shepherd claims that it is 
enforcing Australia’s right under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea to create a whale sanctuary within its maritime exclusive 
economic zone (“EEZ”).3  This Note analyzes the history of this conflict 
and the legal arguments set forth by both Japan and Sea Shepherd, as well 
as the international laws that apply to the situation. 
Part II discusses the history of commercial whaling and steps taken by 
nations to preserve the whale population.  Part III analyzes Japan’s legal 
claim that it is not violating international law by partaking in whaling, 
despite the IWC’s ban on commercial whaling.  Part IV examines Sea 
Shepherd as well as its legal claim under the U.N. World Charter for 
Nature.  Part V details the various international laws that pertain to the 
whalers and the conservationists.  Finally, Part VI provides commentary on 
what should be done to prevent the loss of human life in the Southern 
Ocean that will undoubtedly result if this battle is allowed to wage 
unchecked. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL WHALING                                                       
AND CONSERVATION EFFORTS 
Humans have been killing whales for commercial purposes for 
centuries.4  For hundreds of years, humans treated whales as a “free 
resource” that could be exploited as a gift from nature by anyone who was 
capable and willing to hunt them.5  Because humans lacked the technology 
to harvest the whales in large numbers, however, there was little threat of 
over-exploitation of the species until the advent of industrial whaling 
around the eleventh century.6  After human beings developed the 
technology to efficiently hunt whales farther off-shore, the market for 
whale meat became more lucrative and whalers aggressively pursued 
whales to all corners of the oceans.7  As a result, several whale species 
were threatened with extinction, prompting the hunting and fishing 
industries to realize that the survival of their business depended on 
managing the whale stocks rather than over-exploiting them.8  This 
                                                                                                                          
2 Id. at 66.  
3 See Natalie Klein & Nikolas Hughes, National Litigation and International Law: Repercussions 
for Australia’s Protection of Marine Resources, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 163, 168–72 (2009) (discussing 
Australia’s claim of an EEZ in Antarctic waters and the rights and duties that are associated with such a 
claim). 
4 Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 21, 28 (1991). 
5 Id. 
6 Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great White Whale 
of Preservationism, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 389 (2009). 
7 See id. at 389–90 (“From 1750 to 1870 whales were considered an economically valuable source 
of oil, bone, and other products . . . .”). 
8 D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 4, at 30. 
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prompted several years of limited international regulation of the whaling 
industry to preserve the vitality of the species, but these measures proved 
to be largely unsuccessful.9 
It was not until the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling (“ICRW”), held in 1946, that whaling nations recognized the need 
for more effective measures to prevent over-exploitation of the whale 
stocks.10  Spearheaded by the efforts of the United States, the ICRW set 
maximum catch quotas of whales for each country and, more importantly, 
established the IWC.11  Today, the IWC is the preeminent body tasked with 
regulating the global whaling industry,12 designed to “provide for the 
conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale 
resources.”13  The IWC allows nations that permit their citizens to hunt 
whales, as well as non-whaling nations, to become members and partake in 
decisions through voting.14   
In the early years of the IWC, “whilst the Preamble paid lip service to 
the norm of conservation, it was essentially an arrangement between states 
with an interest in commercially exploiting whales,” and member nations 
focused on ways to continue to exploit the whale stocks.15  Nations 
perceived the IWC as having a weak enforcement mechanism because 
member nations that objected to any amendment passed by the IWC were 
allowed to opt out of the decision and could disregard it.16  As a result, 
even when the IWC set or attempted to enforce quotas for certain 
endangered whale species, whaling nations disregarded the quotas, 
“render[ing the IWC] virtually impotent.”17  Even after the creation of the 
IWC, the whale population continued to decline at alarming rates as the 
member nations focused on passing amendments that protected whalers’ 
economic interests rather than resource management.18   
By the 1970s, several factors contributed to a change in philosophy of 
the member nations of the IWC.  Research conducted around that time 
indicated that the whale population had continued to drastically decline 
                                                                                                                          
9 See id. at 30–32 (discussing attempts to regulate whaling from 1918–45). 
10 Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 397–98. 
11 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. III(1), V(1), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 
1716, T.I.A.S. 1849 [hereinafter ICRW]. 
12 Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 398; see also Adrienne M. Ruffle, Resurrecting the International 
Whaling Commission: Suggestions To Strengthen the Conservation Effort, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 
646–52 (2002) (outlining the history and evolution of the IWC). 
13 ICRW, supra note 11, art. V(2). 
14 Id. arts. II(4), III(1). 
15 Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 398. 
16 Id. at 399–400; see also Ruffle, supra note 12, at 653–55 (discussing how allowing member 
nations to lodge objections “tak[es] the teeth” out of the IWC’s legitimacy). 
17 Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 400. 
18 Cinnamon Pinon Carlarne, Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: International 
Institutions, Recent Developments and the Future of International Whaling Policies, 24 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 6 (2005). 
 1498 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1493 
despite the implementation of the IWC; in 1974, the United States cited a 
study that indicated that there were less than a few hundred thousand 
whales in existence, compared to the four or five million in existence 
before the advent of industrial whaling.19  In response to these alarming 
numbers, many non-governmental organizations began to protest 
commercial whaling, and the environmental groups that already were 
opposed to whale hunting increased the number and intensity of their 
existing protests.20  At the same time, because of the serious decline in the 
whale populations, the whaling industry was no longer economically viable 
for many nations, and these countries stopped whaling and began to 
support preservation efforts instead.21  The United States began developing 
domestic mammal protection programs to protect whales in U.S. waters, 
objecting to whaling on moral grounds.22  Lastly, because the IWC allowed 
non-whaling nations to become members and partake in all voting, several 
nations that were against whaling joined the Commission, some at the 
behest of environmental groups, in an attempt to swing votes against 
commercial practices and in favor of preservation.23 
As a result of the changing philosophy of members of the IWC, nations 
began calling for a moratorium on commercial whaling as early as 1972.24  
These nations demanded that all whaling for profit be prohibited.  Japan, a 
dominant voice for the pro-whaling nations, opposed any ban on 
commercial whaling, calling it “dramatic and emotional,” and arguing that 
the whale populations were plentiful enough to sustain further commercial 
whaling.25  The IWC Scientific Committee backed the Japanese 
perspective, stating that “a blanket moratorium could not be justified 
scientifically” because some of the whale species that were in decline had 
rebounded due to the conservation efforts.26  Despite increasing pressure 
from non-whaling member nations, the IWC refused to adopt any whaling 
                                                                                                                          
19 Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 408. 
20 Carlarne, supra note 18, at 6. 
21 Id.; see also Ruffle, supra note 12, at 648–49 (discussing how the United States, once a 
prominent whaling nation, voiced opposition to whaling, citing research that indicated whales have 
advanced intellectual capacity).  
22 See Howard Scott Schiffman, The Protection of Whales in International Law: A Perspective for 
the Next Century, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 303, 315–17 (1996) (discussing U.S. domestic acts aimed at 
the protection of marine wildlife).  For commentary on why the United States chose to become such an 
“ardent protector of whales,” see Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 412 (“It is arguable that the United States 
might have gained a ‘reputational advantage’ in being perceived as a good environmental citizen.”). 
23 Schiffman, supra note 22, at 317.  
24 See, e.g., Ruffle, supra note 12, at 649 (discussing the U.N. Conference on the Human 
Environment at Stockholm and its proposal for a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling to allow 
the stocks to recover). 
25 PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF 
WHALING TO CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE-WATCHING 365 (1985). 
26 Id. at 422. 
 2010] LOVABLE PIRATES? 1499 
moratorium in the 1970s.  However, the moratorium remained a central 
issue within the IWC, “testing both its identity and future direction.”27   
The IWC finally yielded to the pressure from the preservationist 
nations in 1984 when it adopted an amendment to ban all commercial 
whaling amongst member states, beginning in 1986.28  The IWC set the 
catch quota for commercial whaling to zero for all member nations.  This 
left open the possibility that the quota could one day be adjusted, allowing 
commercial whaling to resume; however, the ban has been extended every 
year since it first came up for renewal in 1990.29 
Since 1986, Japan has emerged as the leader of a coalition to reverse 
the moratorium and resume commercial whaling throughout the world, 
urging the use of conservation methods rather than preservation methods.30  
Following a strategy similar to the one that the environmentalist groups 
followed in the 1970s, Japan is attempting to encourage pro-whaling 
nations in the South Pacific and Caribbean to join the IWC in order to gain 
the critical votes needed to reverse the moratorium; Japan has even been 
accused of attempting to buy votes from these nations.31 
Japan’s ardent pro-whaling rhetoric is somewhat surprising, 
considering the number of nations that now oppose whaling on moral 
grounds.  However, some Japanese citizens continue to view whale meat as 
a delicacy, especially members of the older generation, and many believe 
that whaling is an important part of their culture.32 
In order to more fully protect whale species in the Southern Ocean off 
Antarctica, the IWC adopted a whale sanctuary in the Southern Ocean in 
1993, prohibiting any commercial whaling in this area.33  Even if the IWC 
lifts the ban on commercial whaling at some point in the future, the 
Southern Ocean Sanctuary ensures that member nations will not be 
allowed to hunt commercially in that area.34  Japan lodged an objection to 
the creation of the sanctuary, claiming that the IWC could not justify 
closing the area based on a conservationist argument.35  Their efforts to 
have the sanctuary amendment repealed have thus far been unsuccessful. 
                                                                                                                          
27 Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 415. 
28 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946 Schedule ¶ 10(e), available at 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/schedule.pdf [hereinafter ICRW, 1946 Schedule].  
29 Carlarne, supra note 18, at 2–3. 
30 Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 422. 
31 Id. 
32 See PETER HELLER, THE WHALE WARRIORS 101–03 (2007); Joseph Elliott Roeschke, 
Comment, Eco-Terrorism and Piracy on the High Seas: Japanese Whaling and the Rights of Private 
Groups To Enforce International Conservation Law in Neutral Waters, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 103–
06 (2009) (discussing the prevalence of whaling in Japanese culture). 
33 ICRW, supra note 11, art. V(1)(c); ICRW, 1946 Schedule, supra note 28, ¶ 7(b).  
34 ICRW, 1946 Schedule, supra note 28, ¶ 7(b); Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 442. 
35 Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 442. 
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III.  JAPAN’S LEGAL CLAIM THAT WHALING ACTIVITIES                                       
DO NOT VIOLATE THE IWC’S MORATORIUM ON COMMERCIAL WHALING 
The IWC moratorium did not stop commercial whaling entirely 
throughout the world.  Because the ban is not legally binding on non-
member nations, Canada, an ardent supporter of whaling, chose to leave 
the IWC entirely, allowing Canadian ships to continue hunting whales 
commercially.36  Immediately after the moratorium was passed, Japan, 
Norway, Peru, and the Soviet Union filed formal objections to the 
amendment,37 which allowed them to continue commercial whaling 
legally.38  Except for a brief period in which Norway chose to comply with 
the moratorium, that nation has continued to hunt whales while lodging 
formal objections to the ban.39 
Due to pressure from the United States and threats of embargo under 
the Pelly Amendment, Japan decided to stop commercial whaling activity 
in 1987 and to this day claims that it does not hunt whales for profit.40  But 
despite the fact that Japan claims to have stopped commercial whaling, 
Japanese whaling vessels kill hundreds of whales each year under the 
research exception to the 1986 moratorium.  Because of a loophole in the 
1946 convention that has never been corrected, Japan can slaughter whales 
for “scientific purposes,” including those in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, 
without violating the IWC moratorium.41 
Article VIII of the ICRW provides that “any Contracting Government 
may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national 
to kill, take, and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to 
such restrictions as to number and subject to other conditions as the 
Contracting Government thinks fit.”42  Japan, as a member nation, is 
allowed to set its own quotas for how many and what type of whales to be 
killed each year for scientific research.43  Because the 1986 moratorium 
applies only to commercial whaling, Japan has the legal authority to take 
whales as long as it does so for “research.”44  The IWC states, “Whilst 
member nations must submit proposals for review, in accordance with the 
                                                                                                                          
36 Id. at 400, 417. 
37 D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 4, at 46. 
38 ICRW, supra note 11, art. V(3)(c); see also supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text 
(discussing the opt-out provisions of the IWC that allow member nations to disregard amendments).  
39 Carlarne, supra note 18, at 9. 
40 Nagtzaam, supra note 6, at 421–22. 
41 NAT’L TASK FORCE ON WHALING, A UNIVERSAL METAPHOR: AUSTRALIA’S OPPOSITION TO 
COMMERCIAL WHALING 26 (1997), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/publications/ 
whaling/pubs/whaling.pdf; Carlarne, supra note 18, at 19. 
42 ICRW, supra note 11, art. VIII(1).  
43 See International Whaling Commission, Scientific Permit Whaling, http://www.iwcoffice.org/ 
conservation/permits.htm (last visited June 11, 2010) [hereinafter Scientific Permit Whaling] 
(providing a complete description of the IWC scientific permit program). 
44 Id.  
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Convention, it is the member nation that ultimately decides whether or not 
to issue a [research] permit, and this right overrides any other Commission 
regulations including the moratorium and sanctuaries.”45  The IWC 
Scientific Committee does review the research permits for validity, but it 
has no authority to stop the member nation from issuing the permits and 
cannot alter the quotas of whales to be killed set by the member nation.46 
Japan also does not have to provide scientific studies showing the 
results of its research in order to justify its continuation of its research 
programs.  Japan claims that the research it conducts is a population study 
directed at determining when specific species will be viable enough for the 
IWC to lift the ban on commercial whaling.47  In other words, Japan is 
killing whales to research when the whale population will be healthy 
enough to hunt whales commercially.  Other member nations objected to 
this population research, arguing that it could be conducted using non-
lethal methods, such as taking tissue samples from live whales or using 
photography to capture critical information.48  The Japanese scientists 
counter that some of their research involves analyzing ear plugs and 
stomach contents, which can only be done after the whales have been 
killed.49  Regardless of the objections raised by other member nations, they 
have no authority to restrict or prohibit Japan from continuing its research 
program.  
According to the IWC Scientific Committee, the study conducted by 
Japanese whaling vessels in 2000 “did not address questions of high 
priority relevant to management, did not make full use of existing data, and 
revealed many methodological problems,”50 indicating that the research 
was not producing valid results.  Despite the lack of valid data, Japan 
continues to issue research permits.  Under the 2007–08 Japan Whale 
Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic (“JARPA II”), 
Japan issued permits to government-licensed ships to kill fifty Fin, fifty 
Humpback, and 850 Minke whales, with a ten percent change in allowance 
for Minke whales.51     
As a result of the wording of the ICRW, the Japanese vessels involved 
in the research hunting of whales are permitted to sell the whale meat for 
profit after the research has been conducted.  In fact, the wording of Article 
                                                                                                                          
45 Id. (emphasis added). 
46 Id.  
47 Kazuo Sumi, The “Whale War” Between Japan and the United States: Problems and 
Prospects, 17 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 317, 339 (1989) (“Japan emphasized that the results to be 
obtained by the implementation for this program will provide a scientific basis for resolving problems 
facing the IWC which have generated confrontation among the member nations due to divergent views 
on the moratorium.”). 
48 Id. at 339–40. 
49 Id.  
50 Ruffle, supra note 12, at 657. 
51 Scientific Permit Whaling, supra note 43.  
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VIII of the ICRW mandates that the meat be processed, rather than be 
allowed to go to waste.52  The Japanese government has mandated that the 
whale meat be sold in markets, as well as used for school and hospital 
lunches, the sale of which generates approximately $74 million a year.53  
While there is little doubt that Japan is complying with the letter of the law 
under the IWC research exception, there is also little doubt that Japan is 
only claiming to conduct research in order to circumvent the commercial 
moratorium, thus not following the spirit of the ban.54  
The United States, as well as other nations, has expressed its 
displeasure over Japan’s scientific research program and more specifically 
that Japan uses lethal methods to gather evidence that most scientists agree 
could be gathered using non-lethal means.55  In 2000, President William J. 
Clinton denied Japanese fishing vessels access to fishing allotments in U.S. 
waters in response to Japan’s expansion of their scientific whaling 
program, stating that Japan was undermining international efforts to protect 
whales.56  In 2007, eight U.S. senators called on Japan to scale back its 
research hunting and to abandon plans to kill one hundred whales on the 
endangered species list.57  The senators, in a letter to the Japanese 
ambassador to the United States, wrote:  
[A] Japanese whaling fleet is en route to the Antarctic Ocean 
to hunt these mammals . . . for what Japan has called research 
purposes. . . . We also ask that Japan . . . employ non-lethal 
techniques for studying these populations.  By pursuing these 
actions, Japan can continue to make significant scientific 
contributions, while conserving and protecting these 
important species.58 
Because Japan conducts much of its hunting in the Southern Ocean 
                                                                                                                          
52 ICRW, supra note 11, art. VIII(2).   
53 See HELLER, supra note 32, at 100–03 (discussing the fact that the whaling fleet must receive 
government subsidies in order to continue operating and that the program has never generated enough 
revenue to cover its expenses); Justin McCurry, Big Sushi: The World’s Most Politically Sensitive 
Lunch, MONTHLY, Aug. 2006, at 42, 45–47 (noting that because the demand for whale meat has 
decreased, especially amongst the younger generations, the government has sought ways to deplete its 
whale meat stock by using it for government purposes).  
54 See, e.g., William C. Burns, The International Whaling Commission and the Future of 
Cetaceans: Problems and Prospects, 8 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 31, 49 (1997) (“Japan, 
Norway, and Iceland have dutifully submitted scientific research proposals to the IWC and then 
blithely ignored its recommendations that such programs should not be pursued.”); Roeschke, supra 
note 32, at 112 (“Japan . . . chose to conceal their whaling practices under the guise of scientific 
research.”); Ruffle, supra note 12, at 656 (“[T]he research is only a thinly-veiled attempt to maintain 
the profitability of the commercial whaling industry.”).  
55 See Sumi, supra note 47, at 339 (“The Committee members . . . emphasized that non-lethal 
methods were available for the estimation of recruitment and the study of stock identity.”). 
56 David E. Sanger, Japan: Clinton Orders Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at A6. 
57 Press Release, Sen. Barbara Boxer, Senators Call on Japan To Limit Whale Hunt and Spare 
Protected Whales (Nov. 29, 2007), available at http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/112907.cfm#.   
58 Id.  
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Sanctuary, which is near Australian territorial seas, Australia has become 
particularly vocal about its opposition to Japanese whaling.  Although 
Australia was at one time a staunch pro-whaling nation, it has become one 
of the most prominent whaling opponents in recent years and has adopted 
measures to stop whaling both domestically and internationally.59  
Australia is a member of the IWC and therefore complies with the 
moratorium on commercial whaling.  It also has voiced a great deal of 
opposition to Japanese research whaling, especially when it occurs near 
Australian waters.60   
The Southern Ocean Sanctuary, established by the IWC, is located in 
close proximity to Australian territorial seas.  While no commercial 
whaling is permitted in the sanctuary, the Japanese research fleet often 
hunts for its quota of research kills in this area.61  In an attempt to stop 
whaling in Australian waters, the Australian government established an 
EEZ in the area in 1994 and claims that the waters are protected Australian 
territory.62   
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”), a nation has exclusive sovereignty over the waters of its 
territorial seas,63 which typically consists of all waters up to twelve 
nautical miles from the country’s shoreline.64  Any vessel passing through 
another nation’s territorial seas is subject to that nation’s criminal and civil 
laws but is also afforded the right of safe passage.65  A nation may claim a 
contiguous zone up to twenty-four miles from its baseline, in which the 
nation can enforce violations of customs, immigration, and sanitary laws.66  
A nation may also claim an EEZ up to 200 miles from its baseline for the 
purpose of establishing exclusive rights to explore and exploit the natural 
resources found there.67  Australia maintains that there is an EEZ extending 
200 miles from all Australian sovereign territory.68  It is not uncommon for 
a country to exercise its right to claim an EEZ in order to extensively 
regulate the resources in the area and prevent over-use.69 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Donald K. Anton, Antarctic Whaling: Australia’s Attempt To Protect Whales in the 
Southern Ocean, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 319, 325–32 (2009). 
60 See, e.g., NAT’L TASK FORCE ON WHALING, supra note 41, at 7–8, 63–64. 
61 Id. at 26. 
62 Anton, supra note 59, at 328. 
63 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].   
64 Id. art. 3. 
65 Id. arts. 27–28. 
66 Id. art. 33. 
67 Id. arts. 56–57; see also Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 168–72 (further explaining maritime 
zones under UNCLOS). 
68 Anton, supra note 59, at 328.  
69 For example, the United States established an EEZ in 1982 through a presidential proclamation 
and claims sovereign control over fishing rights up to two hundred miles from all U.S. shorelines.  
48 C.J.S. International Law § 15 (2004).   
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Australia’s claimed EEZ includes not only the waters 200 nautical 
miles off the coast of Australia, but also the waters around Antarctica, 
where the Japanese whaling vessels often hunt.70  Australia has claimed 
sovereignty over part of Antarctica, called the Australian Antarctic 
Territory, since 1933, asserting that it is Australian land.71  Accordingly, 
Australia asserts that the EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from this territory 
as well as from mainland Australia.72 
Under UNCLOS, a nation claiming an EEZ has the authority to protect 
and preserve the marine wildlife within the EEZ.73  In accordance with this 
authority, after establishing its EEZ in Antarctic waters, Australia created a 
whale sanctuary in the area, called the Australian Whale Sanctuary, 
making it a violation of Australian law to kill a whale in these waters.74 
While its claim of an EEZ extending 200 miles off the coast of main-
land Australia is widely recognized, Australia’s claim of an EEZ in 
Antarctic waters is extremely controversial and recognized by only a 
handful of other nations.75  Australia signed the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 
and, in doing so, agreed not to pursue its sovereignty claims in Antarctic 
while the treaty was still in force.76  Because the Antarctic Treaty has not 
been revoked, most nations do not recognize Australia’s right to claim an 
EEZ off the Antarctic territory because, in doing so, they contradict the 
treaty to which their signature is affixed by claiming that the Antarctic land 
is part of Australia.77  Additionally, Australia’s EEZ is challenged under 
UNCLOS because it conflicts with other nations’ sovereign claims in 
Antarctic waters.78  Due to the questions of legality over Australia’s 
claims, only France, New Zealand, Great Britain, and Norway recognize 
the Australian EEZ in Antarctica.79  Thus far, Australia has not enforced its 
domestic law against Japanese whalers hunting in its EEZ, in part because 
of the controversy surrounding its claim and the fact that it is not well 
recognized.80 
Despite the fact that the Australian government has not sought to 
enforce its domestic laws against whaling ships in the EEZ, a private 
                                                                                                                          
70 See Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 171. 
71 Joanna Mossop, When Is a Whale Sanctuary Not a Whale Sanctuary? Japanese Whaling in 
Australian Antarctic Maritime Zones, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 757, 763 (2005). 
72 Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 172. 
73 UNCLOS, supra note 63, art. 56.  
74 Mossop, supra note 71, at 759. 
75 Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 171. 
76 The Antarctic Treaty was written to prevent disputes over sovereignty of the area from 
interfering with the governance of Antarctica.  It encourages, but does not demand, cooperation 
between different nations who have a sovereign claim over the land.  For further discussion of the 
legality of Australia’s maritime Antarctic zones, see Mossop, supra note 71, at 763–66.  
77 Klein & Hughes, supra note 3, at 171–72. 
78 See id. at 170–71 (discussing the issues that arise when EEZs “overlap”).  
79 Id. at 171 n.53. 
80 See id. at 172. 
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citizen group filed suit in Australian federal court in 2008 seeking an 
injunction against the Japanese whaling company Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha 
Ltd. to stop the hunting of whales within the Australian Whale Sanctuary.81  
Although the injunctions were ultimately granted by the Australian federal 
court, they have not been enforced against the Japanese vessels and are 
ostensibly without effect.82  
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE SEA SHEPHERD CONSERVATION SOCIETY AND 
LEGAL CLAIM UNDER THE U.N. WORLD CHARTER FOR NATURE 
Japan has faced intense pressure from other nations, including the 
United States, to stop killing whales as part of its research program.83  
However, the IWC has not taken the steps necessary to close the research 
loophole to prevent the Japanese from exploiting it.  Because of this lack of 
action by member nations of the IWC, environmental groups have taken it 
upon themselves to disrupt what they view as illegal Japanese whaling in 
the Southern Ocean.84  Sea Shepherd has taken the lead in attacking the 
whaling fleet, in part because it takes chances that no other organization is 
willing to take in order to stop the killing of whales.85 
Sea Shepherd was founded in 1977 by Paul Watson, a well-known 
environmental activist, whose actions often puts the lives of whales above 
the lives of people.86  Sea Shepherd, which is supported by private 
donations, claims that its mission is “to end the destruction of habitat and 
slaughter of wildlife in the world’s oceans in order to conserve and protect 
ecosystems and species.”87  In order to fulfill its mission, the group “uses 
innovative direct-action tactics to investigate, document, and take action 
when necessary to expose and confront illegal activities on the high 
seas.”88  These direct-action tactics include ramming whaling vessels, 
firing smoke canisters at their decks, and using ropes to entangle the 
vessels’ propellers.89 
Paul Watson is undoubtedly the face of Sea Shepherd, as he touts 
himself as the captain of the organization’s vessels and Master and 
                                                                                                                          
81 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd. (2008) 165 F.C.R. 510 (Austl.).  
82 See Anton, supra note 59, at 332–39 (providing a complete discussion of the case); Mossop, 
supra note 71, at 758–62 (discussing the early history of the case). 
83 See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text (discussing the United States’ opposition to 
Japan’s whaling research program).  
84 See, e.g., Greenpeace, Full Proposal: Roadmap to Recovery, http://www.greenpeace.org/ 
international/campaigns/oceans/marine-reserves/roadmap-to-recovery (last visited June 11, 2010) 
(asking individuals opposed to whaling to sign a petition to create marine reserves).  
85 See Whaling: Salty Shepherds, ECONOMIST, Jan. 26, 2008, at 43–44. 
86 See Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 58. 
87 Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Who We Are, http://www.seashepherd.org/who-we-are/ 
(last visited June 11, 2010). 
88 Id. 
89 Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 58, 60. 
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Commander of their voyages to the Southern Ocean.90  A Canadian 
national, Watson, along with a group of like-minded activists, founded 
Greenpeace in the early seventies, but he was later voted out of the 
organization for violating their pacifist ethos and using violence to achieve 
results.91  After being expelled from Greenpeace, Watson turned his 
attention to stopping whaling.  Using funds from an animal-welfare 
advocate, Watson purchased his first ship in 1978, filled its front hull with 
concrete in order to facilitate the ramming of other ships, and steered it into 
a whaling vessel off Portugal, causing severe damage.92  Since then, he 
claims responsibility for ramming numerous whaling ships and disrupting 
countless other whale and seal hunts.93 
Sea Shepherd currently has three vessels that it uses in its anti-whaling 
campaigns.  The largest of the vessels, the Farley Mowat, has a reinforced 
steel hull so that it can push through ice fields in the Antarctic waters 
without sustaining damage.94  The Steve Irwin, named in honor of the late 
Australian celebrity and conservationist, is the vessel currently being used 
in campaigns against the Japanese whaling fleet in the Southern Ocean.95  
The organization’s newest vessel bears the name Bob Barker; it was 
originally commissioned as a Norwegian whaler but was later purchased 
by Sea Shepherd with five million dollars that was donated to the group by 
the American game show host.96 
The organization relies on private funds and a crew of volunteers to 
carry out its anti-whaling campaigns.  Its donors include celebrities such as 
Mick Jagger and Steve Wynn, the Las Vegas casino owner.97  The majority 
of the crew are volunteers from a host of different nations, including 
Australia, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, and the Netherlands,98 
and they receive only room and board in exchange for their work on the 
campaigns.99  The majority of Sea Shepherd’s campaigns to stop the 
                                                                                                                          
90 Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Master and Commander: Complete List of Sea Shepherd 
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93 See Roeschke, supra note 32, at 99. 
94 Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Neptune’s Navy, http://www.seashepherd.org/who-we-
are/the-fleet.html (last visited June 11, 2010). 
95 Id. 
96 Mark McDonald, Ships Collide in War of Nerves over Whaling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at 
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97 Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 58–59. 
98 Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Sea Shepherd Crew, http://www.seashepherd.org/who-we-
are/ships-crews.html (last visited June 11, 2010).  
99 The volunteer information page of the Sea Shepherd website states that the organization is 
seeking “people who burn inside with a rage against the injustices perpetrated upon whales . . . . No 
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Japanese whaling fleet take place in the Southern Ocean, off the coast of 
Antarctica, where the Japanese whaling fleet conducts the majority of its 
hunting.100 
The tactics employed by Sea Shepherd against the Japanese whaling 
fleet are sensational, sometimes violent, and intended to be extremely 
destructive.  Sea Shepherd’s actions have prompted Japan and other 
nations to label the group “pirates” and “terrorists.”101  Watson is no longer 
allowed to attend IWC meetings because many conservationists believe 
that his actions have actually turned sympathy away from anti-whaling 
nations.102 
Sea Shepherd vessels are equipped to damage whaling vessels.  The 
Farley Mowat is fitted with a customized device called “the can opener,” 
which consists of a sharpened steel I-beam that is affixed to the side of the 
ship and is designed to puncture the hull of whaling vessels.103  Watson has 
also attempted to ram the Farley Mowat into the stern of a whaling vessel; 
Sea Shepherd boasts that the group is responsible for sinking ten whaling 
vessels since 1979 using these types of tactics.104 
Sea Shepherd was recently involved in a collision with a Japanese 
whaling vessel.  On February 5, 2009, the Steve Irwin and the Yushin Maru 
No. 2, a whaling ship flying under the Japanese flag, collided while 
underway in the Southern Ocean.105  Each group issued statements shortly 
after the incident blaming the other party and, even though neither vessel 
sustained severe damage, it was clear from statements from both sides that 
the Steve Irwin maneuvered too close to the Japanese whaler in an attempt 
to disrupt it from transferring a dead whale to a processing ship.106 
                                                                                                                          
whiners, malcontents, mattress lovers, and wimps need apply.”  Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, A 
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105 Press Release, Inst. of Cetacean Research, Dutch Vessel Rams Japanese Research Ship 
(Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/090206-2Release.pdf.  
106 See id.; Press Release, Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, Whaling Opponents Collide at Sea 
(Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/news-090205-2.html (“We’re 
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As with the February 2009 collision, each side blamed the other for the incident.  McDonald, supra 
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Sea Shepherd has also used prop foulers to disable the propellers of the 
whaling vessels.107  To deploy the device, the group maneuvers its vessel in 
front of the whaling ships while they are making way through the water 
and then cuts across the bow of the vessel, dropping the prop fouler made 
of rope, steel cables, and buoys into the wake of the whaling vessel.108  A 
vessel that has a disabled propeller is at the mercy of the sea and is unable 
to steer into the waves to avoid capsizing.109  The Sea Shepherd crew also 
attempts to disrupt the processing of whale meat on the vessels by 
throwing canisters of butyric acid on the deck of the ships, which spoils the 
whale meat because of its rancid smell.110  Some workers on the Japanese 
vessels have claimed that they sustained injuries after being hit with such 
canisters.111  
In perhaps their most daring move to date, two Sea Shepherd 
crewmembers boarded one of the Japanese whaling vessels at sea in 
January 2008.112  One British and one Australian crewmember jumped 
from a Sea Shepherd vessel onto the deck of the Yushin Maru No. 2 while 
it was underway in the Southern Ocean, claiming that they were not trying 
to harm the crew but were there only to deliver a letter asking the vessel to 
end the whale hunt.113  Sea Shepherd stated that after the activists jumped 
onto the deck of the whaling ship, crewmembers “roughed [them] up” and 
detained them against their will.114  The Japanese whalers claimed that the 
activists were pirates who boarded the vessel illegally and tied the men to 
the mast of their ship.115  The Japanese whalers detained the two 
crewmembers for three days before transferring them to Australian 
authorities, who returned the pair to the Steve Irwin without filing 
charges.116 
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107 See HELLER, supra note 32, at 110. 
108 See id. at 165, 203. 
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Sea Shepherd’s antics are so dramatic that they caught the eye of the 
U.S. cable network Discovery, which created a show called Whale Wars 
that documents the exploits of the group as they pursue the whaling 
fleet.117  The popularity of the show, which airs on the network’s Animal 
Planet channel, prompted Discovery to agree to a contract extension with 
Sea Shepherd, and it is about to enter its third season on cable television.  
It is Animal Planet’s second-best performing show in the network’s 
history.118 
The Japanese scientific body that funds the hunting trips to the 
Southern Ocean has accused the Discovery network of colluding with Sea 
Shepherd to carry out unlawful acts in order to produce better footage for 
the show, claiming that the group’s propensity for violence increased after 
filming began.119  The first season of Whale Wars included footage of the 
two crewmembers boarding the Yushin Maru No. 2.120 
Despite the aggressive actions of Watson and his crew, few Sea 
Shepherd members have been charged with criminal activity in connection 
with their antics.  Neither Watson nor the two crewmembers who boarded 
the Japanese whaling vessel in 2008 were charged with any crime, 
although Japan has threatened to bring suit against them.121  Watson has 
been charged with violating domestic laws in Canada but has spent little 
time in jail for these mostly minor offenses.122  Watson at times even 
demanded to be charged with ramming vessels in an attempt to publicize 
the plight of his group, but he conducts most of his activities in 
international waters where the laws and jurisdiction are unclear, thus 
allowing him to avoid serious consequences.123 
Watson claims that Sea Shepherd has legal justification for its actions 
against the Japanese whaling vessels under the United Nations World 
Charter for Nature (“World Charter”).124  The World Charter was adopted 
in 1982 to provide “appropriate measures at the national and international 
levels to protect nature and promote international co-operation in that 
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field.”125  It was an attempt to set guidelines by which countries should 
guide their actions in regards to conserving nature and urges human beings 
to consider their responsibilities toward the environment.126  The United 
States was the only nation to reject the proclamation.127  The World 
Charter is a resolution and is therefore non-binding on any party to it 
because it does not constitute a formal source of international law.128 
Specifically, Sea Shepherd cites paragraph 21 of the World Charter, 
which states that individuals and groups “shall [s]afeguard and conserve 
nature in areas beyond national jurisdiction,” which includes the Antarctic 
territory.129  Watson often invokes this section of the World Charter when 
asked to justify the ramming of vessels at sea.130  Sea Shepherd claims that 
the Japanese whaling fleet is violating international laws by commercially 
hunting the whales, and therefore the group is justified in stopping the 
illegal activity by reason of “colour of right.”131   
Sea Shepherd’s reliance on the World Charter as legal justification for 
its actions is clearly misplaced.  Even if Japan were whaling illegally—
which it is almost universally accepted that they are not132—the resolution 
does not provide justification for Sea Shepherd to ram or otherwise attempt 
to disrupt the whaling vessels.  The World Charter is non-binding 
legislation that was drafted to encourage nations to work together to 
protect the environment and intended only to set moral principles as to how 
nations should act.133  The World Charter also has no enforcement 
provisions for nations or individuals.134  Critics of Sea Shepherd’s use of 
the World Charter for justification of its actions state that its interpretation 
of its legal authority is “[c]learly wrong” and that “[t]here is no ambiguity” 
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134 Khatchadourian, supra note 1, at 66. 
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on the matter.135  While Sea Shepherd boasts many supporters around the 
world,136 several nations, including the United States, and environmental 
groups have denounced its aggressive tactics and its misuse of the World 
Charter as justification.137 
V.  APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Despite strong rhetoric from the United States and other nations about 
their opposition to Sea Shepherd’s tactics, no nation has yet taken action 
under international law to stop Sea Shepherd.  The group operates on the 
high seas in part because international law is vague and difficult to enforce 
on the seas.138  There are several international laws which may be 
applicable to the situation between Sea Shepherd and the Japanese whaling 
fleet in the Southern Ocean.  Each international law that could be applied 
to the situation, however, has flaws that make it difficult to enforce. 
A.  Piracy Under UNCLOS 
Piracy is currently one of the most pressing issues in international law 
because of the recent outbreak of attacks off the coast of Africa and the 
fact that much of the world’s commerce is transported via the oceans.139  
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as “any illegal 
acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship . . . directed on 
the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft.”140  All states share the obligation 
to suppress acts of piracy on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any 
state.141 
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There are several problems in applying this definition of piracy in 
international law, as UNCLOS “suffers from several defects which have 
hobbled the usefulness of these conventions in combating piracy and 
modern crime.”142  One particularly difficult problem with the definition of 
piracy under UNCLOS is determining what constitutes “private ends.”  
This term is nowhere defined in the text of UNCLOS, but it seems to 
exclude political activities, which would exclude maritime terrorism from 
the definition of piracy.143  Traditionally, a pirate is considered “a private 
individual whose heinous acts are aimed towards achieving some personal 
economic benefit,” so the term “private ends” is typically understood as an 
act done for economic gain.144 
Another ambiguity of the definition of piracy under UNCLOS is the 
term “illegal acts.”  If “illegal acts” is defined under international law, 
there is little ambiguity as to what constitutes an illegal act.  If, however, 
the term is defined under national law, there could be discrepancies in how 
the piracy laws are enforced because the legality of certain acts differs 
depending on national law.145 
In accordance with UNCLOS, states have the sole obligation to repress 
piracy in international waters or in any place outside their respective 
jurisdictions, or, in other words, outside another nation’s twelve-mile 
territorial sea.146  Therefore, any nation that is aware of acts of piracy being 
committed on the high seas has an obligation to help the victims and to 
bring the pirates to justice in municipal courts.147  The municipal courts are 
tasked with working through the ambiguities in the definition of piracy and 
applying international law at a national level.148 
Enforcing piracy under UNCLOS, however, has proven extremely 
difficult.  Nations are hesitant to prosecute pirates under international laws 
in their municipal courts because piracy has traditionally been viewed as a 
domestic problem.149  Nations typically only intervene to stop piracy acts 
committed on the high seas if the state’s own interests are threatened by 
piracy.  Indeed, states will even ignore pleas for assistance from distressed 
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vessels off of their coasts,150 even though they have an obligation to assist 
under UNCLOS.  Thus, most nations do not want to burden themselves 
with apprehending and prosecuting pirates unless it affects their own 
vessels or their own state interests. 
Adding to the enforcement problems, UNCLOS is further weakened 
by ambiguity with regard to enforcement within a nation’s contiguous and 
exclusive economic zones.151  While it is clear that individual nations have 
the duty to enforce domestic piracy laws within their own territorial seas 
(within twelve nautical miles from shore), there is conflicting commentary 
over whether nations have an obligation under UNCLOS to repress piracy 
if it occurs in another nation’s contiguous zone (extending twenty-four 
miles from a nation’s shoreline)152 or EEZ (extending two hundred miles 
from a nation’s shoreline).153  Because there is legal ambiguity over 
whether UNCLOS was intended to extend to these waters, nations have 
argued that piracy is a domestic criminal problem that should be dealt with 
under domestic law.154  Consequently, criminals can avoid prosecution as 
pirates by operating just inside the territorial sea line, thus falling outside 
UNCLOS jurisdiction in most commentators’ view.155 
As a result of this legal wrangling and the unclear definition of piracy 
under UNCLOS, it is unlikely that Sea Shepherd members will be 
successfully prosecuted as pirates for acts that they commit outside the 
twelve-mile territorial sea limit of any nation.  Most of Sea Shepherd’s 
activities take place outside of Australia’s territorial seas because that is 
where the Japanese whaling fleet conducts its research hunts.156  By 
conducting its activities outside this territorial sea limit, Sea Shepherd 
takes advantage of the vagueness of the UNCLOS law.157  Australia and 
other nations that operate vessels in the Southern Ocean could potentially 
bring charges against members of Sea Shepherd under the UNCLOS 
provisions if their vessels intervened in the action between Sea Shepherd 
and the Japanese whaling ships.  These nations, however, are not eager to 
prosecute Sea Shepherd because they are opposed to what they view as 
Japan’s use of the research loophole in the IWC to continue commercial 
                                                                                                                          
150 Id. at 18. 
151 See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of an EEZ under 
UNCLOS). 
152 See MURPHY, supra note 149, at 15 (analyzing the legal ambiguity over whether coastal states 
can exercise their right to control piracy in their contiguous zone). 
153 See id. at 15–16 (discussing the legal ambiguity of enforcing UNCLOS piracy laws in another 
nation’s EEZ). 
154 Id. at 17. 
155 See id. at 9 (observing that, regarding this definition of piracy, “[t]he only people who are 
pleased are the pirates (one minute) or armed robbers (the next minute) as they skip from one side to 
the other of an invisible line that divides the high seas from territorial seas in order to evade capture”). 
156 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
157 Roeschke, supra note 32, at 108. 
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whaling.158  There is no international maritime peacekeeping force on 
which to rely.159  Additionally, even if the nations did apprehend the 
members of Sea Shepherd, there is no established international tribunal 
with jurisdiction to try and punish pirates, so any prosecution would have 
to take place in Australia’s municipal courts.160 
Sea Shepherd members also likely cannot be prosecuted as pirates 
because their actions are not done for private ends.  Under the UNCLOS 
definition, illegal acts of violence and degradation are considered acts of 
piracy if committed for private ends on the high seas.161  Sea Shepherd’s 
actions of ramming whaling vessels and disabling their propellers would 
most likely be considered acts of violence and degradation.  Although 
“private ends” is not clearly defined under UNCLOS, Sea Shepherd 
derives no financial profit from its harassment of the whaling fleet and it is 
unlikely that its actions would be considered done for private ends, thus 
excluding the group’s activities from piracy under UNCLOS.162  For these 
reasons, it is unlikely that any nation would attempt to prosecute members 
of Sea Shepherd as pirates under UNCLOS, much less be successful in that 
prosecution. 
There has been one successful prosecution of an environmental group 
under UNCLOS piracy laws.  The Belgian Court of Cassation found that 
Greenpeace had committed acts of piracy when its members interfered 
with two commercial tankers who were attempting to legally dump waste 
into the ocean.163  The court found that the members of Greenpeace had 
committed the acts for “private ends” because their motivation was the 
achievement of Greenpeace goals and were therefore subject to the 
UNCLOS piracy laws.164  The case “stands for the proposition that 
maritime environmental violence may qualify as piracy under international 
law.”165  Despite the success of this case, it has not been widely followed, 
and there have been no subsequent prosecutions of environmentalists as 
pirates under UNCLOS in the twenty years since this case was decided. 
B.  Terrorism Under International Law 
Because Sea Shepherd’s actions are unlikely to be classified as piracy, 
many nations, including the United States, consider the group eco-
                                                                                                                          
158 See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
159 Tiribelli, supra note 148, at 141. 
160 Id. 
161 UNCLOS, supra note 63, art. 100(a). 
162 See Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, supra note 143, at 5 (“[T]he problem of 
demonstrating a non-private end is compounded . . . by environmentally-motivated actions which are 
not easily categorized.”). 
163 Castle John and Nederlandse Stichting Sirius v. NV Mabeco and NV Parfin, 77 I.L.R. 537, 
537–41 (Belg. Ct. Cass. 1986). 
164 See Menefee, The Case of the Castle John, supra note 143, at 13–14. 
165 Id. at 14. 
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terrorists.166  There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism,167 but  
there are some generally accepted guidelines for how to classify acts of 
terrorism.  The line between piracy and marine terrorism is often 
blurred,168 but “piracy and terrorism are not interchangeable 
phenomena.”169  Whereas pirates usually seek financial gain, marine 
terrorists are motivated by the opportunity to make a political or 
ideological statement.170  Pirates often want to remain anonymous and have 
their attacks go largely unnoticed in the global community, but, on the 
contrary, marine terrorists are interested in publishing their actions so that 
all may hear their political message.171 
Additionally, terrorism is described as “coercion” through “a use of 
force.”172  Terrorism is “the public and systematic use of . . . 
‘extranormal’ . . . violence . . . through the loss of life, property or prestige, 
mainly and ostensibly for political purposes.”173  In order to be effective, 
terrorists must “inflict or threaten to inflict intolerable damage.”174  While 
the term “intolerable” is itself ambiguous, it is clear that the damage 
inflicted by a group must be significant in order to constitute terrorism 
under this definition.175 
                                                                                                                          
166 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Testimony of James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Section 
Chief, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, The Threat of Eco-Terrorism (Feb. 12, 2002), available at 
www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm (describing how acts of “eco-terrorism” have 
occurred around the globe and identifying Sea Shepherd as one of the first organizations to partake in 
such acts); see also HELLER, supra note 32, at 147–48 (discussing how one of the eco-terrorists 
mentioned in the Jarboe statement helped Watson sink two whaling ships in Iceland in 1986). 
167 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he nations of the world are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such aggression as 
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particular times.”). 
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169 Tammy M. Sittnick, Comment, State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the Strait of 
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RIM L. & POL’Y J. 743, 751 (2005). 
170 Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea—The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 337, 343 (2008); see also Pathak, 
supra note 144, at 74 (“[I]n the case of a terrorist, he or she is typically viewed as being religiously or 
morally obligated to undertake a terrorist action which appears to be just.”). 
171 Tuerk, supra note 170, at 343. 
172 Richard K. Betts, The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror, 
117 POL. SCI. Q. 19, 20 (2002). 
173 MURPHY, supra note 149, at 184. 
174 Id. 
175 Incidents of maritime terrorism typically, but not always, involve loss of life.  For example, in 
2004, marine terrorists planted a bomb on a 10,000-ton ferry in Philippine waters, killing an estimated 
116 people.  The most notorious act of marine terrorism was the attack on the Achille Lauro, a cruise 
ship that was boarded by members of the Palestine Liberation Front in Israeli waters in 1985.  One 
passenger was killed and several hundred others were held hostage.  Also, eleven people were killed in 
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Prosecution of terrorists often takes place in national courts rather than 
international tribunals.  The multilateral treaties and conventions that 
define terrorism generally lack international enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure the enforcement of their terms.176  The biggest obstacle that 
international law makers face in creating enforcement mechanisms is 
determining who will bear the cost of enforcement and surveillance of the 
treaty.  In order to get around this obstacle, international law makers 
typically devolve these activities to the states themselves, “piggy-backing” 
on domestic law and enforcement.177  Several multilateral conventions that 
focus on the suppression of terrorism have imposed obligations on the 
states to implement the terms domestically without use of an international 
tribunal, including the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention and the 1971 
Montreal Convention.178 
It is important to note that many nations, not only Australia, have an 
obligation to prosecute terrorists under multilateral conventions.  These 
conventions adopt a “no safe haven” principle in that state parties to the 
convention either must prosecute or extradite those alleged to have been 
involved in terrorist activities to another country that is also a party to the 
treaty.179  Therefore, any party to a convention that prohibits terrorism is 
obligated to either prosecute or extradite alleged terrorists that are found 
within their jurisdiction. 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA”) was adopted in 1988 to 
specifically address acts of terrorism at sea that are not covered by the 
UNCLOS piracy laws.180  It was an attempt to consolidate and apply 
previous “anti-terrorism conventions by adapting their provisions to the 
maritime field.”181  Australia,182 the Netherlands,183 and the United States184 
                                                                                                                          
an attack on the ship City of Poros in waters south of Athens in 1988.  Id. at 187–90. 
176 C. L. Lim, The Question of a Generic Definition of Terrorism Under General International 
Law, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 37, 45 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005). 
177 See id. at 46 (“Where the conduct called into question is not the conduct of the party to a 




180 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter SUA].  SUA was adopted as a 
response to the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985.  Pathak, supra note 144, at 75; see also 
MURPHY, supra note 149, at 187–88 (describing the attack on the Achille Lauro and the international 
response to it). 
181 Tuerk, supra note 170, at 347. 
182 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation: Ratification and Accessions by Various Countries, Feb. 19, 1993, 1777 U.N.T.S. 
587, 588. 
183 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation: Acceptance by the Netherlands, Mar. 5, 1992, 1721 U.N.T.S. 493, 493. 
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have signed this treaty and are bound by its provisions.  Currently, 156 
states are parties to SUA, and these nations’ vessels account for 94.73% of 
the world tonnage on the high seas,185 numbers that indicate the seriousness 
in recent years with which the international community has treated the 
threat of terrorist acts at sea. 
SUA purposely does not define acts of terrorism but instead refers only 
to “unlawful acts” because the drafters thought that defining terrorism 
would be too difficult.186  It “established extraditable offenses of direct 
involvement . . . in the intentional and unlawful threatened, attempted or 
actual endangerment of the safe navigation of a ship.”187  Specifically, the 
Convention states: 
(1)  Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully 
and intentionally:  
. . .  
(b)  performs an act of violence against a person on 
board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of that ship; or  
(c)  destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its 
cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of 
that ship . . . .188 
Despite the use of the term “suppression” in the title, SUA is primarily 
focused on the apprehension, conviction, and punishment of those who 
commit such acts, as opposed to the prevention of terrorist acts.189  Also, 
SUA refers only to unlawful acts that are committed by “any person” and 
therefore excludes offenses committed by governments or state-sponsored 
terrorist organizations.190 
SUA applies to all vessels that are “navigating or [are] scheduled to 
navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the 
territorial sea of a single State.”191  Therefore, only vessels that are not 
scheduled to leave a state’s territorial seas are exempt from the provisions 
                                                                                                                          
184 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation: Ratification by the United States of America, Dec. 6, 1994, 1891 U.N.T.S. 438, 
438.   
185 International Maritime Organization, Summary of Status of Convention, http://www.imo.org/ 
conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247 (last visited June 11, 2010). 
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187 Tuerk, supra note 170, at 350. 
188 SUA, supra note 180, art. 3(a)–(c). 
189 See id. arts. 4–12. 
190 See id. art. 3 (referring only to individuals, not governments or state-sponsored terrorist 
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191 Id. art. 4. 
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of SUA; an attack on these types of vessels would be covered by the 
domestic laws of the state in whose territorial seas the vessel was 
operating.192 
Similar to most anti-terrorism conventions, SUA contains a provision 
specifying that a member state which finds an alleged offender in its 
territory is obligated to either extradite or prosecute that person.193  
However, despite this language, SUA does not impose a strict obligation to 
extradite the alleged offender because “the possibility of non-extradition 
for political offences as well as the right to grant asylum are 
maintained.”194  If no specific extradition treaty exists between the state 
that captured the alleged offender and the state which seeks that person’s 
extradition, the former state may, “at its option,” consider SUA a legal 
basis for the extradition.195  As a result, SUA is weakened because states 
may choose not to extradite an alleged terrorist if the two nations do not 
already have an extradition treaty in place, rather than rely on the authority 
vested by SUA. 
Despite the hope that SUA would be an effective solution to the 
ambiguity of the piracy laws under UNCLOS, it has largely been futile in 
apprehending and prosecuting alleged terrorists.  In addition to the 
independent obligation to extradite offenders in the absence of a specific 
extradition treaty, SUA does not explicitly require a complete jurisdictional 
overview; it only requires that the state in whose territory the offender is 
found “submit the case . . . to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution.”196 There is no requirement that the state complete 
prosecution and punish the individual appropriately.  Additionally, SUA is 
only as strong as the states’ willingness to enforce it.  SUA is intended to 
discourage piracy and maritime terrorism, but “it must be used—and be 
used properly—if that objective is to be served effectively.”197  If member 
nations do not pressure each other to enforce the “extradite or prosecute” 
provision of SUA, it will be unsuccessful in combating terrorism.198 
Even without a binding treaty that requires member nations to 
prosecute terrorists, such as SUA, state action against terrorists can be 
justified under international custom.199  Even though it is not often used as 
                                                                                                                          
192 Tuerk, supra note 170, at 348. 
193 SUA, supra note 180, art. 10. 
194 Tuerk, supra note 170, at 349. 
195 SUA, supra note 180, art. 11(2) (emphasis added). 
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justification for the prosecution of terrorists, “protecting the lives and 
property of one’s nationals against maritime attacks has . . . been accepted 
as an international norm.”200  Therefore, no specific treaty need be cited in 
order to justify counter-terrorist activity, and a nation that is not a party to 
an anti-terrorism international convention is not prohibited from 
prosecuting terrorists based on international custom. 
The members of Sea Shepherd who engage in destructive actions 
against the Japanese whaling vessels clearly fall within the recognized 
mentality of marine terrorists.  One of Sea Shepherd’s stated goals is to 
“expose” what it views as illegal activity by the whaling vessels in the 
Southern Ocean.201  The group is trying to garner attention for its cause, 
even allowing camera crews to film their exploits for production of a 
television show in the United States.202  The group believes that whaling is 
morally reprehensible and is trying to pressure the Australian government, 
as well as other governments and citizens across the world, to change the 
laws and prevent Japanese research whaling.203  Their motivation is both 
political and moral. 
Sea Shepherd’s activities can also be considered “unlawful acts” as 
defined by SUA.  Specifically, members of Sea Shepherd have violated 
articles 3(1)(c) and (3)(2)(a) in that they have attempted to “cause[] 
damage to a ship . . . which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that 
ship”204 by attempting to use prop foulers to damage the propellers of the 
Japanese whaling ships, which, if successful, would leave the whaling 
ships crippled and unable to maneuver, endangering their ability to safely 
navigate.205  Also, Sea Shepherd’s ramming of the Japanese whaler Yushin 
Maru No. 2206 would be classified as an unlawful act under SUA if there is 
evidence that Watson purposely rammed the vessel, thus causing damage 
that was likely to affect safe navigation. 
Even if Sea Shepherd’s actions in the Southern Ocean were classified 
as terrorism or as unlawful acts under SUA, it is unlikely that Australia or 
any other nation that witnesses Sea Shepherd’s actions would prosecute 
                                                                                                                          
COUNTERMEASURES TO PREVENT TERRORISM 191, 203 (Brian A.H. Parritt ed., 1986). 
200 Id. 
201 Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Who We Are, supra note 87. 
202 See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
203 Paul Watson stated in a Sea Shepherd press release:  
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(Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/news-090220-1.html. 
204 SUA, supra note 180, art. 3. 
205 See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
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them under international law for the same reason that they chose not to 
prosecute Sea Shepherd as pirates: these nations do not support Japan’s 
exploitation of the commercial whaling moratorium.  Australia has 
consistently refused to bring charges of terrorism against Sea Shepherd, 
despite Japan’s pleas that the country intervene.207  The enforcement of 
international law, and specifically SUA, relies on the good faith of 
domestic courts208 to enforce the laws, and without Australia’s good faith, 
it is unlikely that Sea Shepherd will be prosecuted as terrorists by Australia 
if other nations do not pressure Australia to do so. 
C.  International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions at Sea 
Australia has received a great deal of criticism from Japan for failing to 
take action against Sea Shepherd.  However, the group’s vessel, the Steve 
Irwin, does not fly the flag of Australia; rather, it is registered in the 
Netherlands.209  As the flag state in which the vessel is registered, the 
Netherlands has obligations under international law to ensure that the 
vessel is operated safely.210  Article 94 of UNCLOS lists several 
obligations of the flag state, but the list is understood to be non-
exhaustive.211  The Dutch government has an obligation to revoke or 
suspend the registration of the Steve Irwin if it finds that Watson and the 
officers are operating the vessel in an unsafe way, in violation of 
international law. 
The International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), of which the 
Netherlands has been a member since 1949,212 established rules for the 
operation of vessels at sea, commonly referred to as “COLREGS,” by 
which all vessels flagged under the member states must abide.213  These 
                                                                                                                          
207 For example, Japan protested the Australian government’s decision to return the two 
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rules were established as part of the Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea in 1972.214  The main purpose 
of the rules, as suggested by the title of the convention, is to prevent 
collisions at sea, and the rules are intended to be vigorously enforced in 
order to maintain overall safety at sea.215 
One of the most important regulations established in COLREGS is the 
obligation of the ship’s master under rule 2 to operate the vessel prudently 
and in observance of “good seamanship.”216  The rule not only reminds 
mariners that they have a legal duty to observe the rules and to apply the 
collision regulations, but “it [also] alerts the mariner that the collision 
regulations . . . require[] mariners to operate their vessels with the same 
care and vigilance that would be exercised by a reasonably prudent and 
professional seaman in the same conditions and circumstances.”217 
While operating in the vicinity of the Japanese whaling vessels, 
Watson violated this regulation when he collided with the whaling vessel 
Yushin Maru No. 2 in February 2009.218  During the encounter, Watson 
claimed that he was only trying to get close enough to the Japanese vessel 
to disrupt the transfer of a dead whale from a harpoon ship to a processing 
ship.219  However, even if Watson did not intend to ram the other vessel, 
which he has done in the past, in attempting to disrupt its activities, he 
maneuvered his own vessel so close to the whaling ship that the vessels 
collided.  Footage of the collision was captured by cameramen working for 
the Discovery network while filming an episode of Whale Wars and clearly 
shows the Steve Irwin ramming the whaling vessel from behind, although it 
is not clear if it was intentional or accidental.220  Regardless of whether the 
collision was an accident, Watson violated rule 2 of COLREGS by not 
operating his vessel in a prudent manner because he maneuvered too close 
to another vessel to prevent a collision. 
                                                                                                                          
214 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 
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Sea Shepherd has violated COLREGS and, in doing so, has violated 
international law.  Because of its participation in UNCLOS, the 
Netherlands is obligated under article 94 to ensure that vessels flying the 
Dutch flag are abiding by international laws to ensure safety at sea and to 
enforce its jurisdiction over offending vessels.  Japan has exerted pressure 
on the Netherlands to withdraw the Steve Irwin’s registration and deem it a 
flagless vessel.221  Recently, some Dutch officials have begun to voice 
agreement with the Japanese government and are trying to amend Dutch 
law so that the Steve Irwin’s registration can be revoked.222 
If the Netherlands revoked the Steve Irwin’s registration and no other 
nation issued the vessel a registration, it would be deemed a flagless vessel 
and would have little protection under international law.  Stateless vessels 
operating on the high seas are “international pariahs” with no recognized 
right to operate freely on the high seas.223  All nations have the right to 
exercise jurisdiction over these flagless vessels and can board them at any 
time:224  “Jurisdiction exists solely as a consequence of the vessel’s status 
as stateless.  Such status makes the vessel subject to action by all nations 
proscribing certain activities aboard stateless vessels and subjects those 
persons aboard to prosecution for violating the proscriptions.”225  If the 
Steve Irwin were deemed stateless as a result of the Dutch government’s 
revocation of its registration, the Japanese government could board the 
vessel in search of evidence of illegal activity any time the vessel operates 
on the high seas or in Japanese territorial water. 
Australia has recently taken some action against Sea Shepherd, 
although it has not resulted in any criminal charges.  The Australian 
Federal Police executed a search of Sea Shepherd’s ship and seized 
documents, video footage, and more than 150 unedited videos as part of an 
investigation into the group’s activities.226  The raid took place after Sea 
Shepherd returned from a trip to the Southern Ocean to engage the 
Japanese whaling fleet.227  The evidence seized, including footage shot by 
the Discovery network employees during production of their television 
show, could be used by Japan to bring charges against Sea Shepherd, 
although no charges have been forthcoming.228 
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VI.  COMMENTARY 
If Sea Shepherd is permitted to continue its actions against the 
Japanese whaling fleet without fear of prosecution from the international 
community, human lives will be lost in the Southern Ocean.  Sea 
Shepherd’s actions are extremely dangerous and could be deadly to the 
Japanese whalers as well as members of Sea Shepherd. 
Sea temperatures in the Southern Ocean regularly fall below thirty-
three degrees Fahrenheit.229  If a person were to fall overboard into water 
below thirty-three degrees without wearing survival equipment, he would 
lose function of his extremities within two minutes and lose the ability to 
keep himself afloat by kicking and paddling.230  Death from hypothermia 
can occur within fifteen minutes.231  Survival times drop significantly if 
there is any kind of wind chill.  The rugged environment in which whaling 
vessels and Sea Shepherd operate is unforgiving.  For example, if Sea 
Shepherd successfully obstructed the propeller of one of the whaling ships 
and it drifted into an iceberg, puncturing a hole in the vessel’s hull, any 
crewmember who abandoned the ship without proper equipment would 
almost assuredly perish from hypothermia before aid arrived.  Similarly, if 
any Sea Shepherd crewmember were to fall overboard, perhaps after losing 
his balance while attempting to board a Japanese vessel, he would likely 
perish before the ship could execute a recovery maneuver.  A Japanese 
crewmember was lost at sea and perished in 2009 after falling overboard, 
although Japan did not allege that it was the result of Sea Shepherd’s 
antics.232  If the international community at large does not act to stop the 
battle between Japanese whaling vessels and Sea Shepherd, it is likely that 
several lives will be lost in the cold waters of the Antarctic. 
Australia and the Netherlands, as well as the United States, are 
opposed to the Japanese exploitation of the research loophole that is 
written into the IWC.  They believe that Japan is carrying out commercial 
whaling under the guise of research.  Because these countries believe Japan 
is violating the spirit of the law, Australia and the Netherlands have 
refused to take action against Sea Shepherd.  Their refusal can be seen as a 
silent protest to the activities of Japan.  By idly watching Sea Shepherd 
attack the Japanese whaling fleet and endanger the lives of the crew 
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onboard the whaling vessels, however, Australia and the Netherlands are 
violating international law and multilateral treaties that require they take 
action against unlawful acts at sea. 
Japan’s use of the research loophole in the IWC moratorium on 
commercial whaling may be disreputable, but it is not illegal.  The research 
exception allows the member nations to set their own quotas for kills done 
for the sake of research and does not specify to what type of research the 
exception applies.  Even though Japan is not following the spirit of the 
IWC’s ban on commercial whaling, it is following the letter of the law and 
making use of an oversight in the drafting of the ban.  If Australia and 
other member nations of the IWC strongly oppose Japan’s research, as they 
clearly seem to, the appropriate action is not to ignore attacks made against 
these whaling vessels by Sea Shepherd that could potentially cost human 
life, but instead to petition the members of the IWC to change the 
provisions of the commercial ban and eliminate the research exception to 
the ban.  Australia and other anti-whaling nations can change the provision 
by gaining the necessary votes to pass an amendment.  Failing to take 
action against Sea Shepherd is not a reasonable response to Japan’s 
activities. 
There are several mechanisms available to prosecute members of Sea 
Shepherd for their actions against the Japanese whalers.  The least viable 
option would be to prosecute Sea Shepherd crewmembers under UNCLOS 
for acts of piracy.  Although Belgium successfully prosecuted Greenpeace 
for its antics,233 this is the only example of a court finding that an 
environmentalist group was acting for “private ends” during its protest of 
perceived harmful activities.  The commonly recognized meaning of 
“private ends” is that the illegal act be done for financial gain, which is not 
one of Sea Shepherd’s motivations.  It would also be inappropriate to 
prosecute Sea Shepherd as pirates when SUA was enacted in part to 
prosecute environmental terrorists who are politically motivated and who 
traditionally fall outside of the definition of piracy under UNCLOS.234 
Both Australia and the Netherlands, however, should take action 
against Sea Shepherd because they are obligated to under international law.  
Sea Shepherd flies the Dutch flag and, in doing so, is guaranteed certain 
protections from the Netherlands.  As the flag state, the Netherlands is 
required under UNCLOS to ensure that the vessels registered with the 
Dutch government are operated safely.  If it does not meet this 
requirement, the government is obligated to suspend or revoke that 
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registration.  Paul Watson, as the captain of the Steve Irwin, has shown a 
disregard for his own vessel and the Japanese whaling vessels by operating 
the ship too close to the whaling vessels to be considered good 
seamanship.  Watson claims that he no longer intentionally rams whaling 
vessels,235 but even if he can be believed, his tactics to place his vessel 
between the whales and the whaling ships is equally dangerous.  A 
collision at sea could be disastrous, regardless of whether it was intentional 
or accidental, and if the collision damaged the structure of either vessel and 
caused it to take on water, crewmembers would perish if forced to abandon 
ship.  By continuing to allow the Steve Irwin to fly the flag of the 
Netherlands, the Dutch government is affording Sea Shepherd protections 
under UNCLOS that it does not deserve because of the unsafe operation of 
its vessel.  If the Dutch government were to revoke the Steve Irwin’s 
registration, the vessel could still operate, but under international law it 
would not be protected from searches and seizures by the law enforcement 
vessels of any nation when it operates on the high seas.  This would 
effectively prohibit Sea Shepherd from continuing its antics. 
In addition to losing its registration, the officers and crew of the Steve 
Irwin should be prosecuted under SUA for unlawful acts committed on the 
high seas.  SUA was written precisely to deal with these types of activities.  
It was created with the intention that it be used by nations to prosecute or 
extradite individuals who commit criminal acts on the high seas without 
regard to their motivation.  SUA specifically did not provide a definition of 
terrorism; instead, the drafters intended that acts that might not be 
traditionally considered terrorism or piracy would still fall within its 
umbrella of jurisdiction.  Under the provisions of SUA, nations must either 
prosecute or extradite alleged offenders found within their jurisdiction.  
This provision was included to force nations to take action rather than be 
passive bystanders.  Australia’s obligations under SUA are not optional; 
the government cannot choose whether to abide by the provisions if 
Australia is a member nation to the treaty.  If Australia is opposed to the 
Japanese whaling activities in the Southern Ocean, the appropriate venue 
for action is to petition the IWC to end the research program.  Ignoring 
violations of international law by individuals who then seek safe harbor in 
Australian ports is a clear violation of the state’s obligations under SUA. 
Any nation that is a party to SUA may take action against members of 
Sea Shepherd that are found within that nation’s jurisdictions.  Australia is 
criticized by the Japanese government for failing to arrest Sea Shepherd 
crewmembers because Sea Shepherd’s vessels frequently pull into 
Australian ports to refuel the vessels and take on supplies.236  Nevertheless, 
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the Sea Shepherd organization and its members frequent many other 
countries.  In fact, Sea Shepherd’s international headquarters is located in 
Friday Harbor, Washington, near the Canadian border.237  The U.S. 
government has the authority and the obligation under SUA to prosecute or 
extradite any crew member that travels to the United States after partaking 
in illegal activities as defined by SUA in support of the anti-whaling 
campaign.238 
The endangerment of life at sea is unacceptable, regardless of the 
reasons cited for the violence.  It is incumbent on Australia, the 
Netherlands, and the international community as a whole—including the 
United States—to use international mechanisms to stop Sea Shepherd’s 
criminal activity in the Southern Ocean. 
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